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PSYCHOLOGY
IN THE SECOND PERSON
In the short history and long past of psychology, historians 
of the science usually point to the founding of the first experi­
mental laboratory by Wilhelm Wundt in Leipzig in 1879 as 
marking the inauguration of psychology as an independent 
discipline. Since it is now almost a hundred years since psycho­
logy has thus established itself, one may well ask to what ex­
tent psychology has fulfilled the high hopes held for it by its 
founders.
There can be no doubt that the early experimental psycho­
logists anticipated that by using the natural scientific method 
which had recorded such resounding triumphs in the 19th and 
20th centuries they would be able to achieve great progress so 
that psychology could take up its rightful place next to the 
established biological and physical sciences, in fact, itself be­
came a biological science using the natural scientific method. 
Thus in 1890 one of the pioneers Theodor Ziehen1 writes that 
this new psychology has banished metaphysics entirely. He says 
that it deserves the term physiological psychology in a double 
sense, Firstly because it uses the methods of physiology rather 
than those of philosophy and secondly, because it always looks 
at the physical parallels of what is experienced in consciousness. 
Moreover, he anticipates that through this new method the old 
contradiction between the material and the psychic can be over­
come.
Two decades later, Watson2 in his book called “Behaviour” 
promises that this natural science approach will cause philo­
sophy to disappear and become the history of science, will 
enable the development of an experimental ethics (instead of a
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speculative ethics based on religion); that it will replace psycho­
analysis with scientific studies of child development and will, 
by controlling development, prevent the psychopathological 
breakdowns which now have to be treated in adult life. He was 
not alone in his hopefulness. A reviewer in the New York 
Tribune wrote at the time “Perhaps this is the most important 
book ever written. One stands for an instant blinded with a 
great hope”3.
The second last chapter of Skinner’s4 book Beyond Freedom 
and Dignity is called ‘designing a culture’. This is a very opti­
mistic note in so far as psychology can hardly have said to have 
finalised its own design. The last chapter is called “What is 
man” and Skinner succeeds in demolishing the idealistic view of 
autonomous man and transferring his functions one by one to 
the enviroment and states his own view of man as a body which 
is a person in the sense that it (i.e. the body) displays a com­
plex repertoire of behaviour. However he believes that this is an 
essential conceptual step to clear the deck for a fully scientific 
study of behaviour and hence for the reconstruction of man’s 
life by positive reinforcement.
In 1930 Freud5 contrasted the scientific Weltanschauung, of 
which he takes psychoanalysis to be an integral part, favourably 
with both western religion and Marxism. Pessimist that he was 
in all affairs concerning the future of civilization, he was none­
theless hoping that psychoanalysis would be accepted as scien­
tific and that through science in general and psychoanalysis in 
particular, man will gradually achieve a better life.
This is only a sample of the high hopes that has been held 
out for psychology and perhaps we may now ask to what extent 
psychologists feel that these expectations have been realised. Let 
me say at once that a vast amount of research has been done 
and that Psychology has great achievements to its credit in both 
theoretical and applied fields. In its present state as a science 
and a profession, it has no special need of an advocate. What 
I want to talk about is something more basic namely to what 
extent psychology has succeeded in confronting its basic sub­
ject matter. In this connection, G. M. Allport6 has remarked 
that in present day psychology specialization is in the saddle,
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that theorizing on the grand scale is frowned out of court and 
that there are plenty of miniscule theories but scarcely any 
that are comprehensively human in their reference. Psychology 
is by no means a unified science. The Oxford philosopher Gil­
bert Ryle7 has described it as “a partly fortuitous federation of 
enquiries and techniques”. Psychology may at the moment, be 
characterised as a series of almost discrete disciplines, some 
having only tenuous ties with other ramifications of the science. 
Theories have ranges of convenience and different foci; different 
sets of prescriptions seem to apply depending on the field being 
investigated and the researcher’s orientation. As regards Ziehen’s 
promise to banish all metaphysics from psychology, an 
eminent American psychologist, Abraham Maslow8 in the 
1960’s made a plea that we should refurbish our basis by turn­
ing back to philosophy, especially philosophical anthropology. 
Moreover, there seems to be a certain drift away from psycho­
logy towards other social sciences, also towards philosophy, 
literature and even theology, because these latter sciences in 
some of their ramifications seem to have come to grips more 
directly with what it means to be a man in the world in which 
we live, whilst some have critized psychology for tending to­
wards the devaluation and homogenization of man rather than 
its opposite.
Thorpe, an eminent clinical psychologist is so dissatisfied with 
what he calls anti-mentalistic, “nothing-but” and dehumanizing 
trends in American psychology departments that he calls for a 
unilateral declaration of independence for all applied psycho­
logy by demanding separate departments.8
A large proportion of psychologists are not unduly perturbed 
by psychology’s present state. For instance the Chairman of the 
German Society of Psychologists, Theo Herrmann10, in a 1973 
address on the state of Psychology sketched the satisfactory 
progress of the science in his country, did not see any reason 
to change its direction and, in regard to the call for a compre­
hensive model for the science,” he said, “It is not possible to 
determine the range of objects of psychology or its unique 
methodology in such a manner that psychologists and possibly 
also non-psychologists can have consensus on this definition”.
5
(Own translation). A paradigm or unified model would not in 
his opinion facilitate research programmes.
Furthermore, he called the argumentation in favour of 
having a central paradigm a scholastic illusion for a closed 
scientific system. Herrmann’s position called forth a sharp re­
action from Robert Kirchhoff11 who agreed that while psycho­
logy has no paradigm at the moment, this is certainly not a 
desirable state of affairs. A somewhat depressing aspect of 
the controversy which continued for a while, was that it did 
not develop beyond the question of generally accepted “model 
or no model” to a consideration of possible models or para­
digms. To me it seems clear that in spite of Herrmann’s strict 
rejection of metapsychological theorising, he is in fact pleading 
for the status quo and the development of psychology along the 
loose lines which are generally accepted but which nearly 
always orient itself towards the model of the natural sciences. 
For me the strategic question is, if we do not have a pre­
liminary paradigm which we can use and keep on refining to­
wards an end paradigm, will our research theorising bear much 
fruit?
In contrast to the somewhat orthodox line taken by Theo 
Herrmann, Leona Tyler12 in her 1973 invited address to the 
American Psychological Association made some statements 
which, from my point of view, are very encouraging but do 
not go far enough. She states amongst others that we should 
now recognise that psychological research and its professional 
applications are co-operative ventures. Furthermore, she empha­
sized the need for new models for research which are not just 
adapted from physics or biology but which have been created 
especially for the sciences in which scientist, subject and con­
sumer of research all belong to the same species. Finally, she 
takes a critical look at determinism, and comes down solidly 
on the side of those who conceptualise man as a being who can 
make choices and that this should be incorporated into our 
model for research in psychology.
To restate:-— Psychology lacking a generally accepted defini­
tion paradigm or model is not a unified science. In the U.S.A. 
where at least 60% of all psychologists (the majority of whom
call themselves eclecticists) live, the scene nevertheless is 
dominated by the two forces of Behaviourism and Psycho­
analysis with the Gestalt school living a quiet, unassuming ex­
istence.
One way of understanding this bipartisan domination is in 
terms of Bakan’s13 mystery/mastery complex. Behaviourism 
respects the cultural taboo on the invasion of the private world 
and the unravelling of the mystery of the inner life by declaring 
itself uninterested in events going on inside the skin but trans­
gresses the taboo on mastery by proposing that manipulation, 
control and prediction is both the way to study behaviour and 
to redesign lives. Psychoanalysis on the other hand, being an 
intrapsychic theory, transgresses the mystery taboo by delving 
into inner complexes, conflicts and repressed memories but 
upholds the taboo on mastery by declaring itself a postdictive 
science.
A second way of understanding is that both are able to 
elaborate valid profiles of behaviour. Psychoanalysis has given 
us a series of concepts for understanding personal histories, 
the individual, the meanings of his actions, symptoms and 
idiosyncracies. It is psychology of the “I”, of the first person 
and tends to blot out the environment or at least to put it in 
brackets. Behaviourism on the other hand has given us a frame­
work for looking at behaviour objectively, has devised ingenious 
ways to observe and has highlighted the determined, controlled 
and reflexive aspects of our lives. It is a psychology of he or 
she or perhaps even “it”, but nevertheless a psychology in the 
third person. It tends to highlight the environment but to 
bracket the experiencing subject. However, a psychology in 
the second person has been in existence in Europe since the 
1920’s; has accepted neither Wundt’s psychophysical parelellism 
nor Watson’s behaviourism, and declared its independence from 
Psychoanalysis, but has made its impact on the U.S.A. only 
since the late 1950’s. There it has had increasing support, 
especially under the banner of humanistic psychology, some of 
its aspects being relatively independent of Europe, while in 
Europe it has the support of a long Geisteswissenschaftliche 
tradition. In South Africa it has made an impact on Psychology
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Departments over the last few years as a direct European 
importation rather than as re-export from the U.S.A. but has not 
yet developed a vigorous growth.
Contemporary psychologists have tended to adhere to scien­
tific methods established by and for the physical sciences rather 
than those phenomena which form their subject matter. They 
have forgotten that physics developed its method after deciding 
on the best way to study the phenomena they were interested 
in. Although Natural Scientists, whenever they investigate new 
phenomena, have, of necessity, to start with their own ex­
perience, psychologists seem somehow hesitant to do likewise 
in regard to the phenomenon of man. They have also forgotten 
that physics has shedded some of its values and foundations 
without fear of loosing its status as a science. In this regard 
I can only refer to Heisenberg who said of the changes brought 
about by the study of neuclear physics that with increasing 
accuracy its picture of nature becomes further and further 
removed from what may be called living nature, or nature as 
we know it in everyday life. It becomes more remote from the 
conception of classical physics of a mechanical material world 
which moved according to immutable laws. The fact that this 
machine and science itself was the product of human thought 
constructs appeared irrelevant at the time and not important 
for the understanding of nature. However, physical scientists, 
according to Heisenberg, no longer deal with the world as 
directly perceived by us but with its background as brought 
to light by experiments which means that the objective world of 
natural science is “a product of our active intervention and 
improved technique of observation”14.
The American psychiatrist, H. S. Sullivan, tried to show 
that observation in psychology is always participant observation. 
Participant observation means that that which one observes 
is not indifferent to the observation and that what is eventually 
observed is not the person as isolated entity, but the person 
relating to the person doing the observation or to the total 
situation. This insight, however, has not been assimilated into 
general and experimental psychology although nobody wishes 
to deny the validity of these observations. In spite of many clear
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observations that the performance of humans and animals in 
experiments are affected by the attitude of the observer, the 
dominant trend in psychology remains the study of man as 
object in which the ideal of objective, non-participant, neutral 
and detached observation is the keystone. The fact that since 
Heisenberg’s discovery of the indeterminacy principle in 1927 
physics itself has been moving away from this attitude, has not 
had a sufficient impact in psychology.
In an article in the American Psychologist Boulding15 writes 
“All sciences of themselves are part of the system which they 
study. All scientists are participant observers in their own 
systems. In the physical sciences, and to somewhat lesser extent 
in the biological sciences, it is possible for a time to maintain 
the myth of non-participation and to suppose that the scientist 
simply studies an empirical world which is not affected by the 
fact that he is studying it”. This means that the approach that 
the scientist brings towards his science, will have an effect on 
what that science will turn out to be. In other words, truth, 
scientific truth is not independent of the attitude brought to it 
by the researcher i.e. by his approach. By approach in psycho­
logy is meant the fundamental viewpoint towards man and the 
world that the scientist brings to his work, whether this view­
point is made explicit or not. Since however, natural science 
psychology has given precedence to fidelity to the method, it 
means that they must bring to the science of psychology a 
view of man which is compatible with natural scientific method, 
which means that they are forced to accept the view of man as 
being in the last instance object, intricate mechanism, or mere 
organism.
A psychology in the second person studies man as dialogue, 
as relatedness to fellow man, to the world and to himself as 
living body and life history or lived time. The approach is 
deeply grounded in philosophy — the attitude of Verstehen or 
understanding which goes back to Pascal’s esprit de finesse and 
Dilthey’s demarcation of Geisteswissenschaft from Naturwis- 
senschaft. Another source goes back to Soren Kierkegaard in 
his studies of self and anxiety continued by the psychiatrist and 
philosopher Carl Jaspers who has deeply influenced modern
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psychopathology. However, the main root derives from Edmund 
Husserl’s Logische Untersuchungen published in 1900 who in 
turn owed much to Franz Brentano’s Act psychology and his 
concept of intentionality. Husserl’s phenomenology was taken 
up by psychologists and psychiatrists at a very early stage, but 
has had its strongest impact via his great pupil and successor at 
Freiburg, Martin Heidegger whose book Sein und Zeit, pub­
lished in 1927 heralded phenomenological existentialism. Direct­
ly and also as a result of the work of Jean Paul Sartre, this 
philosophy has had a great influence on leading European 
psychologists and psychiatrists such as L. Binswanger, Erwin 
Straus, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, E. Minkowski, Medard Boss, 
L. Buytendijk and J. H. Van den Berg to mention but a few. 
This psychology is not however, exclusively a phenomenological- 
existential one. The interpersonal or cultural psychoanalysts 
such as H. S. Sullivan, Karen Horney and Erich Fromm and 
other psychologists who I cannot name here have contributed 
substantially to its concepts. This trend, namely to see man 
as related to world, the individual as involved with fellowman 
is discernible not only in psychology and philosophy, but in 
other areas as well. The titles of Martin Buber’s epochmaking 
work Ich und Du, Max Scheler’s Wesen and Formen der 
Sympathie, and at least some of the work of Karl Barth reveals 
this trend. In literature the homeless generation in which the 
individual was seen as being isolated and out of communion 
became less characteristic whilst in the work of T. S. Eliot the 
individual is taken out of the narrow confines of the 
individualistic self and seen to realize himself in contact with 
fellowman. The importance of this is superbly expressed in 
Cocktail Party where Celia says,
“Do you know—
It no longer seems worthwhile to speak to any one.” and 
later continues:
“ . .. everyone is alone—or so it seems to me.
They make noises, and think they are talking to each
other;
they make faces and think they understand each other.
And I’m sure they don’t. Is that a delusion?”
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However, the fact that this second person psychology (the 
term was first used by the French psychologist Paul Foulquie 
in 1951)16 has had a venerable parentage and that it has made 
an impact, certainly does not mean that it has established it­
self as a viable alternative to behaviourism, psychoanalysis or 
even Gestalt psychology. It can only establish itself as a valid 
alternative approach in psychology if it can demonstrate that 
it has a method which holds the promise of being able to 
understand man behaving in his world in a better way than 
the other two or alternatively, if it is shown that it is a neces­
sary supplement to these two established approaches. The fact 
that it has already deeply influenced contemporary psycho­
therapy and counselling is important. It is important in these 
fields because it has offered an understanding of man: not as 
man as “sick” or “normal” organism, it has clearly shown the 
differences betyeen psychotherapy as a manipulative technique 
and psychotherapy or counselling as a venture into the ex­
ploration and hopefully confirmation of self and unique ex­
istence in relation to a fellow man called therapist or counsellor. 
Above all, it has clearly revealed that psychological observation 
is participant observation. However, it is clearly not enough 
because this is only a part of the total field and it will have to 
show its viability in a much bigger arena.
Allow me then to make a number of basic statements about 
how I see psychology in the second person:—
The world we live in is Mitwelt, a world which we share with 
others. I know and trust my experience. That we can know and 
understand the experience of others is a premise basic to the 
operation of our whole social world. We can communicate with 
each other. To say that we cannot understand a person is 
usually the same as saying that we cannot communicate with 
such a person. The Mitwelt is, moreover, a fundamental premise 
for psychology as a human science. It means that it is the task 
of the psychologist to investigate and make explicit the infinite 
variety of human experience in the infinite variations of his 
behaviour.
All psychology rests upon communication. The task of the 
psychologist is to understand people by making explicit what
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people can communicate to him concerning their experience and 
behaviour. In order to make meaningful explications he will con­
tinually draw on his own experience which will have been built 
up out of his own dialogue with the world and fellowman. When 
I say psychology depends on communication, I do not deny that 
communication is often indirect and mostly imperfect. Neither 
do I mean that it depends exclusively on what man, the sub­
ject of investigation can verbalize. Through the intercourse 
between body and world, body and significant others, the child 
builds up a prereflective world, pregnant with meaning. What 
is meant through terms such as mother, at-home-ness, father, 
hard, soft, etc. is already part of our preverbal encounter with 
the world. For instance, I don’t have to be taught (verbally) 
that a table is hard, I have built up an unmediated experience 
of its hardness in as much as I encountered it with my living 
body. It is also the task of psychology then to make these 
prereflective meanings communicated through the living body 
reflectively clear.
I have never met a psychlogist or anyone else who experiences 
himself or herself as pure mechanism, thing or mere organ­
ism. If I do not experience myself as such, then I do not think 
one can build a meaningful psychology by starting with a premise 
of man as thing or organism. Although I deny neither the 
substantiality of my body, nor the fact that it has much in 
common with that of an animal, nor the materiality of the 
things around me, I am in a dialogue with my world and 
fellow man in the way that a thing or even an animal is not. 
Even while I was writing this paper, I was not experiencing 
myself as a being using my nervous system to think and my 
hands and fingers as instruments to make marks on paper. I 
did however, experience myself already in dialogue with the 
people who will listen (or perhaps not listen) to me. Will they 
agree, disagree or suffer in silence? This means that I must 
deny that materialistic philosophy offers an adequate basis for 
the science of psychology. It does not however, mean that I 
deny the substantial contributions that have been and still can 
be made by psychologists basing themselves on this premise.
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At the same time I must reject the view of man emanating 
from idealist philosophy where man is seen as isolated sub­
jectivity who can only perceive the world by taking it into 
himself (so to speak), who sees relating to the world in terms 
of a statement that reality has appearances in the mind or the 
brain etc. I am not a self sitting in my brain; on the contrary, 
to be man means to exist (with the emphasis on the ex) to be 
already out there, to be with others, interacting with the world. 
This means that I cannot isolate aspects of man’s behaviour e.g. 
thinking, emotion and so on and study these in isolation from 
man’s encounter with the world and fellowman. Behaviour must 
always be studied in context. In making this last statement, 
I find myself in substantial agreement with behaviourist learn­
ing theory which makes essentially the same statement, but 
then goes on to redefine and impoverish context as cues and 
settings i.e. stimuli or constellations of stimuli. This means that 
a psychology in the second person which is similar to be­
haviourism in that both oppose the intrapsychic model of man, 
parts company with behaviourism again in as much as the former 
does not objectify or reify context; on the contrary it tries to 
explicate context as lived encounter, as system of meanings 
experienced by the person in a specific situation. The en­
vironment is not perceived by us as mere neutral space filled by 
things with objective characteristics, but speak to us in character 
as physiognomy of the world17. Neither is the world of every­
day action (Lebwelt) a private world; on the contrary it is 
from the very beginning an intersubjective cultural world be­
cause we live as humans among other humans whom we under­
stand and by whom we are understood.
In as much as this psychology refuses to reify or objectify man 
or world it is clear that it will not emphasize psychology’s 
contemporary goal to quantify its statements except for clearly 
defined and circumscribed purposes. It cannot agree with Thur- 
stone’s absolutization of the measurement position, (which 
states that everything that exists, exists to some degree and 
what exists to some degree can be measured), because it is 
clear that some processes are so pervasively disturbed by the 
act of measurement itself that it is forever eluding the observer.
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The emphasis on quantification which has helped physical 
science to such great heights cannot be useful to psychology to 
the same extent because what is salient in man’s encounter with 
fellowman and the things is not the quantity of experience and 
behaviour but its meaning i.e. how it is constituted qualitatively. 
Moreover, the emphasis on quantifiable hypotheses and state­
ments in psychology has tended to exclude from investigation 
phenomena which show little promise of being measurable.
I certainly will not be able in the time allotted to explicate 
fully what is implied by a psychology in the second person. 
From what I have said already it should however be clear 
that in such an approach research activity will not endeavour 
to restrict itself to experimentation and will give up the myth 
of the independent observer in favour of participant obser­
vation. Because man as a subject behaves in a way which re­
flects his intentionality, his experience of an experiment should 
always be made part of the experiment. Instead of approaching 
our scientific task in the understanding of behaviour and ex­
perience in such a manner that we always aim at measurable 
quantities of experience and behaviour we will try to make 
unprejudiced faithful discriptions of what is experienced in 
terms of its meaning and qualities to individuals. In as much 
as man and contexts are ever changing it is impossible to 
do research on the basis of identical repetition but it is 
possible to get to know the phenomenon being researched 
through varied manifestations18.
A psychology of the second person does not deny the 
valuable contributions made by the dominant differential 
psychologies, but it does object to their reductionistic emphases 
namely to explain human behaviour on the basis that what 
moves man is in the final analysis, nothing but the vicissitudes 
of the libido (Freudian psychoanalysis) or contingencies of 
reinforcement (Skinnerian behaviourism). A psychology in 
the second person is pretentious enough to hope that by 
developing its view of man into an anthropological psycho­
logy it can reinterpret and integrate the findings of differ­
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ential psychologies such as psychoanalysis, behaviourism, 
personalism, personal construct theory etc. into a more com­
prehensive and unified science.
An anthropological psychology, a psychology in the second 
person, a psychology of thee and me: this psychology must 
speak to us in a language that we can understand. It does 
not need to build up a special technical vocabulary but tries 
to speak of man in the language of his experience. Psycho­
logy is fundamentally a form of knowledge that is so bound 
up with man’s capacity for insight into his life and actions 
that the comprehensibility of psychological interpretation 
may overlap quite extensively with its validity. This psycho­
logy must speak to us in the present and in the immediate 
future of those things which are salient now: of love, fear, 
achievement and apathy, feelings of being understood or 
rejected and so on. In short, it must investigate the meaning­
ful phenomena which constitute our lives. It must do so now 
and in our immediate future. I cannot hope that this psycho­
logy will always be the psychology of man; not only the 
Zeitgeist but man himself changes demanding that he be 
explicated anew. On the other hand I prefer this to the 
accumulative fragmentalism which is third person psychology’s 
undertaking eventually to give us a consistent explanation 
of all of man’s behaviour.
There are many fields of application in psychology in which 
this approach is promising but I would specially like to men­
tion that terribly intricate web of relationships, overt and 
covert struggles and conflicting ideologies which constitute 
the South African situation. Surely a psychology in the 
second person focussing on how people relate to each other 
and to their world, how people experience each other and the 
world in their respective reference groups and outside it; 
how not only different political ideologies but also different 
and conflicting cosmologies condition individual lives, can 
make some contribution to unravelling these complexities. 
Very useful transcultural and attitude studies have been done 
but what is needed for a deeper understanding is a method 
which would allow us to look at individuals from an in­
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ternal framework i.e. to open up the landscape of their world. 
For instance, psychological studies of the indigenous diviner, 
a key figure in traditional ethnic groups, have not, up to 
now, enabled us to understand what is valid in his work and 
how it is valid and it is unlikely to do so unless we can 
explicate what terms like sickness, evil, virtue, dream, com­
munication, body, spirit, plant, animal etc. mean to him. In 
other words to understand him we must explicate his world 
as a system of meanings as it presents itself to him19.
A second person psychology does not aspire to the elegant 
mathematical exactitude to which some differential psycho­
logies hope to lead us. Neither can it hope for the excitement 
which psychoanalysis inspired in its systematic exposition of 
deep conflicts in the lives of our elders. In its exposition 
of man’s subjectivity as realised in the physiognomy of the 
world; of the nearness and farness of things and persons 
trusted and not trusted, in the emphasis on starting with our 
primary experience it stays fairly close to everyday life and 
mostly uses the language of everyday life. It has been suggested 
that it tends to slip into a bourgeois Gemutlichkeit, but this 
need not necessarily be so. In psychotherapy for instance, 
one may, after working through and explicating one’s every­
day experiences and constructions come to grasp the horizons 
within which one constitutes one’s unique life and thus to 
confront the cosmic backdrop of life just as N. P. van Wyk 
Louw in his poem, “Beeld van ’n jeug: duif en perd”, uses 
the simple images of boyhood to show how these point beyond 
themselves to cosmologies and then back again to the 
horizons which contain one’s vitality.
If an antidote to a comforting bonhomie is needed we 
need only heed the angry voices of the radical psychology 
movement which, in the wake of Marcuse’s unsuccessful 
attempt to adapt Freud’s constructs for his programme to 
achieve basic changes in our life form, is using the insights 
of a psychology in the second person to show how con­
sciousness is conditioned by capitalist social structure, how
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various behaviour patterns and deviations stem from power 
relations and so on. I have no illusions about the attractive­
ness of this approach to people who are deeply concerned 
about the manipulation of social reality and the politics of 
experience, neither would I deny the valuable insights which 
may be contributed ,in this way, but I must warn that in its 
onesided emphases and intense hostilities, it is in danger 
of becoming an “us and them” rather than a true second 
person psychology.
A psychology in the second person certainly does not avoid 
exploring the relationships between power structures, ex­
ploitation, consciousness and behaviour. It must, however, 
also speak of unrepeatable individual lives which are con­
stituted (not only conditioned) in a specific culture or cul­
tures. In the course of doing so, however, it also transgresses 
another taboo of contemporary life in that it speaks of sick­
beds,29 terminal illnesses and death, not indifferently as mere 
biological events nor hopefully as the portal to a new life nor 
escapistically as in the observation that men die and that it 
is bound to happen to us sometime, but experientially as 
distantiation from the trusted context of life, as parting, 
loneliness, anguish and the possible overcoming of these, 
above all as the final horizon of life in so far as psychology 
can speak of it and thus as decisive co-constitution of that 
unique, always varied, sad/joyful life which is the possession 
of thee and me.
It is clear that a psychology in the second person does not 
only refer to man in relation to fellowman, but to man as 
dialogue in the totality of world. Nonetheless, man as we know 
him, is inconceivable apart from his community of fellowman 
and to understand him, we must put the “I” back into the 
“Thou” as Dilthey has phrased it. This does not mean that a 
psychology in the second person will set up one’s closeness and 
involvement with fellowman as an absolute standard of being 
fully human. Relating to other people can take place at various 
levels of closeness or distantiation, directness or obliqueness and 
at present in our other-directedness, in our emphasis on human 
need and Mitmenschlichkeit, many people experience fellowman
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as being too close. The emergence of a profusion of new Chris­
tian and other religious approaches, including the new import­
ance of meditation, should by no means be seen as a way of 
not relating or as a flight into a new “I”-ness, but rather as a 
strategy to attain an optimal distance from fellowman and thus 
(perhaps paradoxically) to deepen relationship.
Mr. Vice-Chancellor, in conclusion—a personal note. When 
I exchanged a crowded professional life for academia about 
ten years ago, part of the reason was that I felt that the 
approaches in which I had been schooled and had schooled 
myself, did not enable me adequately to understand the life 
forms of those whom I saw in a variety of situations. First at 
Fort Hare and now at Rhodes I have had the opportunity to 
come to a constructive renewal and reintegration of views 
which I sincerely hope has been and will be of some use to 
students of psychology with some of whom, especially in 1975 
postgraduate classes, I have had an involvement which, I hope, 
has been mutually gratifying. For this privilege as well as for 
the cordial and stimulating relations with members of my De­
partment, with other colleagues, with the Administration and 
with you personally, I record my grateful thanks.
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